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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the cash holings of government linked corporations
(GLCs) in Singapore, with different levels of Temasek Holdings ownership. We find
evidence that Temasek owned public firms hold on average substantially more cash
than otherwise similar public firms listed on SGX. This result is robust to different
measures of Temasek ownership. We also show that when GLCs have excess cash, they
do not spend it on capital expenditure, acquisition, dividends or share repurchase.
Instead, they hoard these excess cash leading to an accumulation of cash. In addition,
we show that Temasek firms are on average more profitable, however the accumulation
of excess cash is reducing their profitability.
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1 Introduction
The conflict between shareholders and managers and precautionary motivation are two of
the most widely accepted mechanisms why firms hold cash. Because state ownership could
affect firms’ exposure to agency problem and their financing capability, it provides a suitable
empirical setting to study on how agency problem and financing condition affect corporate
cash holdings. In addition, this allows us to find new determinants that attribute to cross-
sectional cash holding variations. Megginson, Ullah, and Wei (2014) indicate that state own-
ership has a negative impact on cash since the firms with more state ownership suffer from
more soft budget constraint effects and hence need less cash. Using data on Chinese public
firms, Kusnadi, Yang, and Zhou (2015) show that non-state-controlled firms hold less cash
than state-controlled firms because of political extraction such as expensive bank loans; for
non-state-controlled firms, the developed institutions has a more pronounced positive impact
on corporate cash holdings than for state-controlled firms since the developed institutions
can reduce the threat of political extraction. It has been shown that the impacts of state
ownership on corporate operations are heterogeneous across countries. Specifically, in most
countries including China, state ownership could help firms get cheap financing and more
government-related investment opportunities, and it also adversely affects firms because of
the dual agency problems (i.e. agency problems between managers and shareholders and
those between shareholders and government). In Singapore, government-linked corporations
which are usually under the control of Temasek Holdings (Temasek) have a reputation for
being well-governed (Ang and Ding (2006)) and do not enjoy cheap fund because of their
link to the government (Ramirez and Tan (2004)). Therefore, government-linked corpora-
tions in the Singapore context provides us a new setting in which the previous findings are
unable to explain how Temasek holding affects corporate cash holdings. Do Temasek holding
companies averagely hold more or less cash than non-Temasek companies? How Temasek
holdings affect corporate cash holdings? In this paper, we hope to answer these questions.
Using the sample of Singapore-listed firms and the voting rights of Temasek from the
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year 2004 to 2014 We find that on average GLCs hold more cash than otherwise similar
non-GLCs, which is contrary to the findings using data from Chinese firms. Specifically, we
observe GLCs hold 5%-12% more cash on average than the others. We also use the percentage
of voting rights as a robustness check and find that on average, for every additional voting
right, GLCs cash increases by 0.1% to 0.5% depending on how many controls we included.
We further explore the decision of GLCs with excess cash in order to understand how
Temasek holdings affect corporate cash holdings. We find that government-linked corpora-
tions do not over spend excess cash through external channels like capital expenditure and
acquisition, as well as internal channels like payout dividends or do any share repurchase.
Instead, they allow the excess cash to hoard leading to an increase in cash holding over time
by cutting off the dividend payout in the future. This is not the same as Harford, Mansi,
and Maxwell (2008) in that they find that firms with worse governance tend to spend cash
quickly while we find that firms with good corporate governance will hold the more cash
and the manager do not over consume the excess cash. Additionally, we also show that on
average GLCs are more profitable than other non-GLCs but GLCs with excess cash holding
will harm their profitability in the future.
Our paper is the first to look at the cash holding of GLCs in Singapore. We contribute
to the corporate cash policy literature. The decision of internal funds, such as cash and cash
equivalents, is an essential issue which revolves around the conflict between shareholders
and managers as Jensen (1986) suggested. Earlier studies by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999) provide the determinants of corporate cash holdings for listed firms in the
U.S. and find that firms determine their optimal cash balance by trading off the costs and
benefits of holding cash. Agency problems and financing constraints are two main reasons
why firms hold cash reserve. However for each case, the predictions and empirical results are
quite different. Gao, Harford, and Li (2013) find that in the US, the aggregate effect is due to
agency conflicts instead of financing constraints, by giving evidence that public firms (greater
agency problems but lower financing constraints) hold more cash than private firms (lesser
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agency problems but higher financing constraints). Their prediction supports the theoretical
argument by Jensen (1986) that firms with greater agency conflicts hold more cash in order
to increase perquisites consumptions. Using only public listed firms in U.S.,Harford et al.
(2008) find that firms with poor corporate governance hold less cash because self-interested
managers prefer to quickly spend excess cash even if the expenditure does not value add
the firm in future. Using an international sample, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes
(2003) show that firms in strong investor protection countries hold less cash. They argue
that this is the case because firms’ shareholders in countries with strong investor protection
are able to better limit the managers perquisite consumption by forcing them to disburse
excess cash back to shareholders. All the three papers are in support of the agency theory
as the main reason for firms cash policy decision, though their empirical results on cash
holdings are mixed. On the other hand, Opler et al. (1999) and Sufi (2009) give predictions
that financially constraint firms hold more cash than otherwise less financially constraint.
This is because cash is required for either speculation on future investment opportunities or
precautionary motives. That is to say, firms that have difficulty raising cash will prefer to
hold more cash in preparation for future uncertainties. Based on the literature above, this
paper extends the literature by using Singapore samples to examine the impact of agency
problem and financial constraint on the cross section variations of cash holdings between
GLCs and Non-GLCs.
We also contribute to the literature on the impacts of state ownership on firms financial
decisions. In the early days, this strand of literature is mainly on how state ownership affects
corporate performance and financial constraints. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) show that
performance measures are negatively related to the level of state ownership among Chinese
firms while La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find that government ownership
of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Unlike SOEs in other
countries, Temasek acts as a commercial investment company, promoting good corporate
governance as well as transparency in their portfolio of companies. Extensive research has
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already been done to suggest that GLCs in Singapore practice better corporate governance
and therefore allowing these firms to be more profitable than otherwise similar firms (Ang
and Ding (2006), Ramirez and Tan (2004) and Sim, Thomsen, and Yeong (2014)). Recently,
regarding why firms are holding lots of assets as cash, there are some papers trying to explore
whether corporate cash holdings is affected by state ownership using data of Chinese public
firms (Megginson et al. (2014),Kusnadi et al. (2015)) Since GLCs in Singapore have lots of
different features in terms of governance, financing advantages compared to SOEs in other
countries, we expect Temasek holdings have different impacts on corporate cash holdings.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction of
Government Linked Corporations and Temasek Holdings. We present the data and summary
statistics used in this paper in Section 3. Section 4 studied the determinant of cash holding
by comparing GLCs v.s. non-GLCs. Section 5 explores the reasons for GLCs from an
investment decision and future profitability point of view, and summary in section 6.
2 GLCs and Temasek Holdings
Government linked corporations are created by the Singapore government in late 1960s to
promote industrialization and development in strategic industries of the economy. Pioneer
GLCs are usually in the area that lack private sector funds or expertise, for example, ship-
building and ship repair: Keppel, Sembawang, and Jurong Shipyards; finance: the Devel-
opment Bank of Singapore; and strategic location industry: Neptune Orient Lines. These
GLCs operate fully as for-profit commercial entities on the same basis with other private
sector companies. Unlike SOEs in other countries, GLCs in Singapore do not receive any
subsides or preferential treatment from the government.
Temasek Holding was formed in 1974 as a private commercial company wholly owned by
the state’s Ministy of Finance. At that time, 36 companies were transferred to Temasek’s
control. Temasek Holding directly holds 20 first-tier listed GLCs in 2004 which grow to 24
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listed GLCs in 2013 in our sample. The first-tier GLCs can also directly or indirectly
hold other public or private firms, therefore the total number of GLCs is estimated to
be in the hundreds. The companies Temasek invested in are involved in a wide range of
sectors, including financial services, telecommunications media & technology, transportation
& industrials, consumer & real estate, energy & resources and life sciences & agriculture1.
Temasek owns its assets outright as a commercial investment company and not as a fund
manager. It pays taxes and contributes back to the government through annual dividends.
There seems to be a clear separation between the government role as policy makers and as
shareholders in Temasek Holdings. For example, one of the Singapore government’s policy is
to make Singapore an air-hub in the region, an aim that take precedence over its interest in
Singapore Airlines (SIA) as a company2. In this paper, we use the time series information of
Temasek voting rights of firms to determine if the firm is a government linked corporation.
Since most government linked corporation are not fully controlled by the government, their
objectives are much more like a private firms. Government ownership here serves much
more like an influential monitors, with numerous research linking it to better performance
(Ramirez and Tan (2004), Ang and Ding (2006)) due to better corporate governance (Mak
and Li (2001), Kusnadi (2003)).
3 Hypothesis development
We test the following two hypotheses related to the control of agency problem and financ-
ing constraint with the management of firm cash resource. Agency Theory Hypothesis:
GLCs hold more cash. Temasek owned firms usually practice better corporate governance
and thereby reducing agency problems within the firm. Consistent with the spending hy-
pothesis in Harford et al. (2008), the managers are unable to quickly spend on cash on value
destroying projects, leading to the accumulation of excess cash (also consistent with the
1See http://www.temasekreview.com.sg/major-investments/index.html
2see http://business.asiaone.com/news/temaseks-one-kind-sovereign-wealth-fund
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agency theory in Jensen and Meckling (1976)). This accumulation of excess cash lead to
Temasek owned firms holding more cash than non-Temasek owned firms. Financing Con-
straint Hypothesis: GLCs hold less cash. Temasek owned firms enjoy low cost of debt due
to the implicit debt guarantee by the government (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson
(2013)). Therefore, those firms are less financially constraint and they can raise money easily
from the market at very low cost whenever they need. The less financially constraint firms
would hold less cash in advance therefore GLCs hold less cash than non-GLCs.
4 Data and summary statistics
4.1 The database
The main database used in this paper is the S&P Capital IQ (McGRAW HILL FINAN-
CIAL) database. The Capital IQ database provides annual historical financial statements of
Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) listed companies. These financial statements consisting of
12 different sections: Key Stats, Income Statement, Balance Sheet, Cash Flow, Multiples,
Historical Capitalization, Capital Structure Summary, Capital Structure Details, Ratio, Sup-
plemental, Pension OPEB and Segments, are downloaded and the required financial data is
than extracted. In our sample, we only consider firms listed on SGX main board and have
their headquarters situated in Singapore, and exclude firms that are defined as funds or trust.
The firms Industry classification is based on Fama French 17 industry classification using
their respective 4-digit SIC code. We exclude the financial firms and utility firms since they
have different disclosure regulations and their liquidity position are different from the rest.
Considering the impact of extreme value and outliers, we winsorize all firm characteristics
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Thus the full sample consists of 485 unique firms with 4195
firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013.
In addition to collecting firm’s annual financial statements, we also collected Temasek’s
ownership of listed SGX firms in terms of percentage of common equity owned by Temasek
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Holdings (Private) Limited. Although Temasek Holdings is a private company, and therefore
do not require to disclose their holdings under their portfolio, the public firms on the other
hand require to disclose who owns them. Since in this paper we are interested in the implicit
influence by Temasek owned firms, it is the voting rights held by Temasek that we need
to measure instead of the cash flow rights. As documented in Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and
Xuan (2011), large shareholders can exercise effective control over a company with a relative
small direct stake in the cash flow rights by using pyramid ownership structures and cross-
holdings. Therefore to compute voting rights we sum all the voting rights held by Temasek
up to the secondary chain of corporate control using a threshold of 10% indicating a major
shareholder. For example, suppose firm A owns 50% of firm B and firm B owns 20% of firms
C. Therefore the cash flow rights of firm A onto C is 10% (= 50% × 20%) and the voting
rights of firm A onto C is 20% (since 50% implies that firm A has full control over firm B).
Voting rights are winsorized to 0 if it is less than 1%. An additional Temasek variable is
computed, the Temasek dummy, which takes the value one if Temasek has voting rights on
the firm (Temasek Voting Rights > 0) and takes the value zero otherwise. Evidence shown
using the Temasek indicator variable will be robust to using both the cash flow rights and
voting rights variable.
4.2 Cash holdings
The main focus of our analysis is to analyse firm’s target level of cash holdings and eventually
how it affect the firm’s profitability or valuation. Generally, larger size firms tends to hold
more cash than smaller size firms, therefore the variable of interest in this paper is actually
the firm’s cash ratio. The Cash ratio is calculated using the variable Total Cash and Short
Term Investments scaled by Net Assets, where Net Assets is Total Assets less Total Cash and
Short Term Investments, similar to Yun (2009). Yun (2009) point out that scaling by total
assets will cause mechanical negative correlation for an increase in cash. As an alternative
measure, we also compute the Industry-adjusted cash which is the industry-median-adjusted
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cash scaled by Net Assets. Our results are robust to either of the measure.
4.3 Alternative liquidity vehicles
A firm’s level of cash holdings for their corporate liquidity also depends on the amount of lines
of credit available to them. Firm with no access to bank’s lines of credit would inevitably
hoard more cash as a precautionary hedge or savings for future unexpected investment
opportunities. Yun (2009) provides evidence that firms with poor governance increase their
level of cash holdings relative to lines of credit when the level of takeover threat decrease.
Sufi (2009) documents that firms with low cash flow are less likely to obtain bank’s line of
credit and therefore have to rely more heavily on cash for liquidity. Given the above evidence,
controlling for whether the firm has access to lines of credit will give a more accurate measure
of a firm’s level of cash holdings. In the Capital IQ database, data on the firm’s line of credit
can be found in the capital structure summary page, under debt summary. Two forms of
line of credit data can be extracted namely the Total Revolving Credit, the amount of debt
incurred from using lines of credit, and Undrawn Revolving Credit, the amount of lines of
credit promised to the firm but not used. For the purpose of our analysis, we reconstruct
two different variables using the given line of credit data. They are the Line of Credit
variable, Undrawn Revolving Credit scaled by Total Liquidity Demand, and the Line of
Credit Dummy, an indicator variable that take the value one if the firms has access to a
bank’s line of credit and zero otherwise. Total Liquidity Demand is calculated by adding
Total Cash and Short Term Investments with Undrawn Revolving Credit.
4.4 The corporate governance index
Using an index measure of corporate governance to estimate the degree of agency problems
a firm faces has been popularised since the publication of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003), naming it the GIndex. Using similar motivation and based on the Singapore Code
of Corporate Governance, Singapore Management Univeristy, Sim kee Boon Institute for
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Financial Economics (SKBI) developed an index for companies listed in the Singapore Stock
Exchange (SGX), namely the Singapore Corporate Governance Index (CGI). This index
is a weighted average questionnaire score of five different categories; rights of shareholder,
equitable treatment of shareholders, roles of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency and
board responsibilities and composition. The resulting CGI sample provided by SKBI consist
of 2534 firm year observations from 2007 to 2013, and ranges from 0 to 100. A higher score
means that a firm practices better corporate governance than a firm with a lower score.
4.5 Firm characteristics
Motivated by Gao et al. (2013) the following variables are firm characteristics that may
explain variations in a firm’s cash holdings: firm size, Cash Flow, Revenue Growth, Leverage,
Net Working Capital, Capex, Acquisition, R&D, Dividend Dummy, Payout Ratio, Tobin’s Q,
Foreign Revenue and MNC. Size is the natural log of Net Assets. Cash Flow is the operating
cash flow scaled by Net Assets, where operating cash flow is computed as EBITDA minus
Net Interest Expense minus Income Tax Expense. Revenue Growth is percentage change
in Revenue. Leverage is the Long Term Debt scaled by Net Assets. Net Working Capital
is Current Assets minus Current Liabilities minus Total Cash and Short Term Investments
and scaled by Net Assets. Capex is Capital Expenditure scaled by Net Assets. Acquisition
is the Acquisition Expenditures scaled by Net Assets. R&D is the R&D Expenditure scaled
by Net Assets. Dividend Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm
pays dividend, and zero otherwise. Tobin’s Q is calculated using Total Assets minus Total
Common Equity plus Market Value of Equity scaled by Total Assets. Foreign Revenue is
the Total Revenue minus Revenue earned in Singapore scaled by Total Revenue. MNC is an
indicator variable that takes the value one if the firm Foreign Revenue is more than 20%,
and zero otherwise. In addition, in all our regression, we control for year and industry fixed
effects.
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4.6 Summary statistics and uni-variate analysis
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of main variables in full sample and in sub-sample
(Temasek v.s. non-Temasek). In each sample, we report the number of observation and the
mean value of the variables. The difference in mean and the t-statistic of Wilcoxon-Test
of the differences in mean are reported in columns 7 and 8. In full sample, we see that
cash ratio of firms in Singapore is 34%, which is much higher than the average cash ratio of
firms in U.S. (about 17% to 18% in U.S listed firms). As for the firm characteristics, firms
in Singapore are less leverage, have less net working capital, spend less capital expenditure
and R&D investment but give more dividend payout as compared to firms listed in U.S..
As for Temasek firms, they on average hold less cash but they are much larger in size than
non-Temasek firms. On average Temasek firms net assets is about twice as large as non-
Temasek firms. Therefore we should employ multivariate analysis to exam the cash ratio by
controlling the size effect.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Most firms listed in Singapore pays dividends. In the U.S., only 33% 3 of public firms
pays dividend, whereas in this sample, 65% of public firms pays dividend. In addition, within
Singapore, 84% of Temasek listed firms pays dividends in contrast to the 64% of non-Temasek
firms. Similarly, the payout ratio of Temasek firms is on average larger than non-Temasek
firms. In terms of investment opportunities, Temasek firms have larger Tobin’s Q than non-
Temasek firms. Lastly, using the CGI measure for corporate governance, Temasek firms on
average practice better corporate governance than non-Temasek firms. This is consistent
with the findings by Sim et al. (2014).
3Figure borrowed from Gao et al. (2013)
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4.7 Correlation matrix
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the study. We can see
that the Temasek dummy is positively highly correlated with value-weighted CGI, size, cash
flow, leverage, capital expenditure, payout ratio, Tobins Q and negatively highly correlated
with lagged cash ratio, net working capital. Thus, we should controlled these variables when
doing the multivariate analysis.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
5 Empirical results
5.1 Determinant of Cash Holding
Determinants of corporate cash policy and how cash policy eventually affect firm value are
some of the interesting questions academics want to find answers for. Using similar empirical
exercises used by Gao et al. (2013), and additional variables such as the corporate governance
index and lines of credit, motivated by Harford et al. (2008) and Sufi (2009) respectively, we
hope to shed some light on the determinants of cash policy in Singapore.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
Table 3 presents the cross-sectional regression results of a model of cash holdings. Ex-
planatory variables are adapted from various extended literature, in particular by Gao et al.
(2013). The dependent variable is cash, cash holdings scaled by net assets. In addition to
the explanatory variables mentioned in the data section, industry and year fixed effects are
included to control for the industry-adjusted and year-adjusted unobserved effect.
The results in column 1 show some evidence that the determinants of cash policy for
US firms may be different from those for Singapore firms. This may not be that surprising
because the business and geographical environment of Singapore and US is different in many
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aspect. For example, the domestic market in Singapore is not as big as US, therefore firms in
Singapore tend to expand overseas to look for greater demand. The following are evidence
similar to Gao et al. (2013). Larger firms hold less cash which support the economics of
scale story. Firms with greater cash flow, greater investment opportunities and less net-
working capital hold more cash. Firms that spent more on capital expenditures hold less
cash supporting the spending hypothesis and firms that does more research and development
hold more cash supporting the financing constraint story for information asymmetry firms.
The following are evidence found different from the study on US firms. In the US, firms
with greater leverage hold more cash because external debt increases external monitoring
which limit the agency problems faced by public US firms. This in turn prevents these firms
from unnecessary spending cash, resulting in more cash holding. However in Singapore,
there is no relation between leverage and cash. After controlling for agency problems, in
column 3, we found an opposite result from the US: higher leveraged firms hold more cash.
This may be due to the low cost of debt in a business friendly environment such that
investing with debt can be more profitable than investing with cash, causing excess cash to
be hoard and not spent. Firms that pay more dividend hold more cash which contradicts
the financial constraint story and suggests that firms that are financially constraints do
not pay dividends and hold more cash. However after controlling for the level of agency
problems in each firms using the CGI, the relation disappears. Lastly, multinational firms
or firms with greater foreign revenue do not hold more cash. This is not surprising when
we compare the corporate tax laws between US and Singapore. In the US, foreign cash are
taxed when repatriate, therefore US firms with greater foreign cash hold more cash because
these cash are kept abroad even though there are no existing investment opportunity. In
contrast, Singapore do not practice double taxation on the same revenue, and in conjunction
of having one of the lowest corporate tax rate of 17% (MENON and ASSOCIATES (2014)),
before tax exemptions, most repatriated cash are not taxed. Therefore consistent with the
repatriation tax story, we should not expect any relation between foreign cash and cash
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holdings for Singapore firms.
Motivated by theoretical research that argues both cash and lines of credit are substitutes
in an efficient market without financing frictions, we regress cash with line of credit dummy
and the usual controls to empirically test this hypothesis. Consistent with the theory, we
found that on average, firm with lines of credit hold 12.5% less cash. After controlling
for agency problems, this number is reduced to 4.3% and still significant. Since there is a
possibility that cash policy and governance are jointly determined, prior literature suggest
to use lagged cash as an instrumental variable. After controlling for lagged cash, we found
evidence suggesting that on average firms with better corporate governance hold more cash.
5.2 GLCs and cash holdings
Papers such as Sim et al. (2014) and Ang and Ding (2006) give evidence that Temasek firms
practice better corporate governance. Since most of the firms in Temasek’s portfolio are
there since inception, there exist minimal selection bias,i.e, Temasek chooses firms which
already have better corporate governance. However care has to be taken when interpreting
the results using the Temasek variable. The result can only explain the cash holding of firms
if the firm uses Temasek unique good corporate governance practices and engage in business
activities in a business environment similar to Singapore.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
Table 4 presents the cash model regression results with the Temasek dummy and vot-
ing rights as additional explanatory variables. In column 2, after controlling for the usual
suspects, we show that Temasek firms hold 12% more cash than otherwise similar public
firms. This number monotonically decrease after adding additional controls such as the Line
of credit Dummy, to control for firm access to alternative liquidity, and the CGI index, to
control for agency problems. However the coefficient on the Temasek dummy still remains
positive and significant. Using Temasek voting rights instead of a Temasek dummy gives
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similar results. In terms of economic significance, from column 8, for every 1% increase in
Temasek voting rights onto the firm leads to a 0.1% increase in cash holdings. This result is
consistent with our hypothesis that Temasek owned firms on average hold more cash because
they practice better corporate governance and thereby reducing agency problems within the
firm. The next natural question will be to investigate why Temasek firms hold more cash
and whether holding more cash today is related to increasing future profitability thereby
increasing future firm value or decreasing future profitability leading to a decrease in future
firms value. Prior research by Ramirez and Tan (2004), Sim et al. (2014) and Ang and Ding
(2006) show consistent evidence that Temasek firms are more profitable than other similar
public firms. In addition,Ramirez and Tan (2004) found evidence that Temasek firms are
valued 20% more than similar non-Temasek firms in the market. Although Temasek firms
are more profitable, the question of whether holding more cash is associated with Temasek
firms being more profitable still remains unanswered.
5.3 GLCs and their investment and payout decisions on excess
cash
In this section, we try to examine why Temasek firms hold more cash than other similar
public firms by analysing how Temasek owned firms use excess cash. Here we define excess
cash as the firm unexplained cash portion of cash holdings. Specifically, the residual from
regressing cash on firm-specific characteristics (table 3, column 1) represents the firms excess
cash. We focus on three different possible decisions a firm can make when presented with
excess cash. Firstly, a firm can use its excess cash to make external investments. We
investigate this possibility by looking at the capital expenditure and acquisition variables in
our sample. Secondly, a firm can return these excess cash back to the shareholders in a form
of dividends or share repurchases. We can investigate this by looking at the payout ratio and
the share repurchases variable. Lastly, a firm can also choose to do nothing and accumulate
the excess cash with the current level of cash. We examine the excess cash, the relation with
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being Temasek owned and the interaction of these variables on the firms future investment
decisions. The dependent variable is one of the four investment decisions and the main
explanatory variables is the lagged Temasek variable and the interaction variable between
lagged Temasek and excess cash. The other control variables include: lagged dependent
variable, lagged excess cash, lagged change in excess cash, lagged size, net working capital,
leverage, revenue growth, and year and industry fixed effects.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
Results of the analysis are presented in table 5. Results from Model 1 and 2 suggest that
Temasek firms when on average do not do more capital expenditure and acquisition. However
when faces with excess cash, they spend it on acquisitions. However this results is not robust
to the Temasek variable. The relation disappear when we use Temasek Voting Rights instead
of the Temasek dummy. Results from model 3 and model 4 on payout policy is somewhat
surprising. On average, Temasek firms pay more dividends. When faces with excess cash,
Temasek firms reduces their payout ratio instead. This result is similar when using Temasek
Voting Rights instead of the Temasek dummy. This suggest that Temasek firms are hoarding
more cash when they have excess cash. This is consistent with our hypothesis that when
firms have excess cash, it is a signal that the demand for investments are less than the
usual levels. Therefore firms will hoard cash during these times in preparation for future
investment opportunities. One possible way a firm can increase cash holdings is to decrease
their payout ratio.
5.4 GLCs, excess cash and profitability
The analysis made in Table 5 suggest that the only decision made by Temasek firms when
they have excess cash is to decrease dividend payout and hoard more cash. Taken together
with the conclusion made on Table 4, we have shown some evidence on why Temasek firms
hold more cash: Temasek firms do not spent excess cash. In this section, we turn our
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attention to how these excess cash affects Temasek firms profitability. What we are interested
in this section is how this period decisions affect next period profitability. To measure
profitability, we use 4 different measures: Tobins Q, Return on Equity (ROE), Return on
Sales (ROS) and Return on Assets (ROA). As for the main independent variable, we are
examining the relation between Temasek firms and the interaction with excess cash. Excess
cash is define similar to table 5: the firms unexplained cash portion of cash holdings. Other
control variables in the cross-sectional analysis includes: lagged dependent variable, lagged
excess cash, lagged change in excess cash, lagged size, net working capital, leverage, revenue
growth, and year and industry fixed effects. Table 6 presents the regression results.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
We begin our examination by looking at the coefficients on the Temasek Dummy and
Temasek voting rights variable. Consisting with existing literature, Temasek firms are on
average more profitable than otherwise similar public firms. The evidence seemed compelling
as the only coefficient that is not positively significant is the regression on model 3. However
when we examine the coefficients on the interaction term between excess cash and Temasek,
7 out of 8 of the models gives negative coefficients and 3 of the negative coefficients are
significant. This suggest that holding on to excess cash may result in the reduction in firm
future profitability.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we gain insights into the determinants of cash policy for Singapore listed
public firms which differ from the US case in some areas. We have also provided evidence
that Temasek-owned firms on average hold more cash than non-Temasek-owned firms. This is
consistent with the argument that firms with more agency problems tend to overspend excess
cash leading to a lower cash holdings. In addition, we have shown that Temasek-owned firms
do not spend excess cash on investments, dividend payouts or repurchases. Instead these
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excess cash are accumulated and overtime leading to an increase in cash holdings. Adding
to our evidence, we show that Temasek-owned firms on average practice better corporate
governance and are more profitable. However the accumulation of excess cash is causing
them to be less profitable.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample consist of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. Firm’s industry classification
is based on Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. Cash is the Total Cash and Short
Term Investments scaled by Net Assets where the Net Assets is computed as Total Assets less Total Cash and Short Term
Investments. Industry-adjusted cash is the industry-median-adjusted cash scaled by Net Assets.∆ cash is the change is cash
ratio. Size is the natural log of Net Assets. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow scaled by Net Assets, where operating cash
flow is computed as EBITDA minus Net Interest Expense minus Income Tax Expense. Revenue Growth is percentage change in
Revenue. Leverage is the Long Term Debt scaled by Net Assets. Net Working Capital (NWC) is Current Assets minus Current
Liabilities minus Total Cash and Short Term Investments and scaled by Net Assets. Capex is Capital Expenditure scaled by
Net Assets. Acquisition is the Acquisition Expenditures scaled by Net Assets. R&D is the R&D Expenditure scaled by Net
Assets. Dividend Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm pays dividend, and zero otherwise. Tobin’s
Q is calculated using Total Assets minus Total Common Equity plus Market Value of Equity scaled by Total Assets. Foreign
Revenue is the Total Revenue minus Revenue earned in Singapore scaled by Total Revenue. MNC is an indicator variable that
takes the value 1 if the firm Foreign Revenue is more than 20%, and zero otherwise. Line of Credit (LOC) is the Undrawn
Revolving Credit scaled by Total Liquidity Demand, where Total Liquidity Demand is calculated using Total Cash and Short
Term Investments + Undrawn Revolving Credit. Line of Credit Dummy (LOC Dummy) is an indicator variable that takes
the value 1 if the firm has access to banks’ line of credit, and zero otherwise. Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is the CGI
index of all SGX listed firms provided by SKBI(SMU). The CGI is a continuous number ranges from 0 to 100. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Superscript ***,**,and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Full Sample Non-Temasek Temasek
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Difference t-stat
cash 4178 0.3417 3933 0.3482 245 0.2380 0.1102*** 3.2473
Industry-adjusted cash 4178 0.1522 3933 0.1583 245 0.0537 0.1046*** 3.1248
∆cash 4169 0.0375 3924 0.0385 245 0.0216 0.0169 1.2525
Firm Characteristics
Size 4178 4.9260 3933 4.7794 245 7.2791 -2.4997*** -26.1887
Cash Flow 4149 0.0848 3904 0.0823 245 0.1254 -0.0431*** -3.7471
Revenue Growth 3981 0.1691 3738 0.1702 243 0.1521 0.0181 0.5198
Leverage 4178 0.0899 3933 0.0855 245 0.1609 -0.0754*** -8.7165
NWC 4178 .0258 933 0.0319 245 -0.0720 0.1039 *** 4.6708
Capex 4121 0.0675 3876 0.0670 245 0.0761 -0.0091 -1.6388
Acquisition 4178 0.0088 3933 0.0088 245 0.0099 -0.0011 -0.5116
R&D 4178 0.0008 3933 0.0008 245 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0008
Dividend Dummy 4195 0.6529 3950 0.6410 245 0.8449 -0.2039*** -6.5366
Payout Ratio 4195 0.3126 3950 0.3028 245 0.4710 -0.1682*** -4.8952
Tobin’s Q 3937 1.3155 3693 1.2889 244 1.7184 -0.4296*** -6.0997
Foreign Revenue 4195 0.5732 3950 0.5753 245 0.5401 0.0352 1.3369
MNC 4195 0.7213 3950 0.7246 245 0.6694 0.0552* 1.8693
Alternative Liquidity Vehicles
LOC 4181 0.0625 3936 0.0624 245 0.0630 -0.0005 -0.0426
LOC Dummy 4195 0.5502 3950 0.5514 245 0.5306 0.0208 0.6343
Corporate Governance Measure
CGI (Value Weighted) 2534 62.5979 2370 62.0401 164 70.6584 -8.6183*** -10.9504
CGI (Equally Weighted) 2534 61.1272 2370 60.5126 164 70.0101 -9.4975*** -11.3147
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Table 2
Correlation matrix
The sample consist of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. All continuous variables are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. p-values are reported in brackets.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. TEMASEKt 1
2. LOC Dummyt -0.01 1
[0.53]
3. CGI(VW)t−1 0.21 0.03 1
[0.00] [0.11]
4. Casht−1 -0.05 -0.22 -0.09 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
5. Sizet 0.38 0.13 0.33 -0.35 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
6. Cash Flowt 0.06 -0.10 0.12 0.20 0.04 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
7. Leveraget 0.13 0.05 0.09 -0.18 0.36 -0.08 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
8. NWCt -0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.21 0.08 0.18 -0.03 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.98] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07]
9. Capext 0.03 -0.15 0.09 0.13 -0.03 0.20 0.10 -0.23 1
[0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
10. Acquisitiont 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 1
[0.61] [0.20] [0.37] [0.00] [0.03] [0.37] [0.02] [0.01] [0.63]
11. R&Dt 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 1
[1.00] [0.00] [0.30] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.69] [0.91] [0.08] [0.89]
12. Payout Ratiot 0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 1
[0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.47] [0.64] [0.06]
13. Foreign Revenuet -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 0.10 -0.03 -0.08 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.04 1
[0.18] [0.26] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.25] [0.09] [0.00] [0.01]
14. Tobin’s Qt 0.10 -0.11 -0.02 0.24 -0.16 -0.06 0.04 -0.40 0.14 0.10 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 1
[0.00] [0.00] [0.46] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.24] [0.00]
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Table 3
Determinants of Cash holdings
This table examines the determinants of cash holdings of firms listed in SGX. To do this, we regress Cash on various firm char-
acteristics, alternative liquidity vehicles and the corporate governance index. The sample consist of 4195 firm-year observations
from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. Firm’s industry classification is based on Fama French 17 industry classification
using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors are clustered at industry level. Superscript ***,**,and * denotes
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Casht (1) (2) (3) (4)
Casht−1 0.660*** 0.653***
(0.044) (0.044)
LOC Dummyt -0.125*** -0.043***
(0.013) (0.014)
CGI(VW)t−1 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Sizet -0.135*** -0.129*** -0.080*** -0.078***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Cash Flowt 0.809*** 0.772*** 0.294** 0.290**
(0.105) (0.104) (0.145) (0.144)
Tobin’s Qt 0.032** 0.028** 0.038* 0.036
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.022)
Leveraget 0.007 0.021 0.228*** 0.228***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.077) (0.077)
NWCt -0.446*** -0.440*** -0.263*** -0.263***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.049)
Capext -0.278** -0.345*** -0.639*** -0.660***
(0.115) (0.114) (0.159) (0.159)
Acquisitiont -0.011 -0.044 -1.506*** -1.493***
(0.262) (0.258) (0.258) (0.258)
R&Dt 7.727*** 7.138*** 2.766 2.675
(1.746) (1.675) (1.905) (1.888)
Payout Ratiot 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.007 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Foreign Revenuet -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024)
Constant 0.801*** 0.867*** 0.435*** 0.459***
(0.053) (0.055) (0.074) (0.077)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 3881 3881 2096 2096
Adjusted R2 0.327 0.342 0.624 0.626
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Table 4
Determinants of Cash with Temasek Holding
This table examines the cash holdings of Temasek’s publicly listed firms relative to firms listed on SGX. To do this, we
regress Cash on the Temasek variables, various firm characteristics, alternative liquidity vehicles and their respective corporate
governance index. Columns 1-4 are regressions with Temasek dummy as an independent variable, whereas columns 5-8 are
regressions with Temasek Voting Rights (Temasek VR) as an independent variable. The sample consist of 4195 firm-year
observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. Firm’s industry classification is based on Fama French 17 industry
classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors are clustered at industry level. Superscript ***,**,and
* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Casht (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TEMASEKt 0.235*** 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.058**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
TEMASEK VRt 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Casht−1 0.652*** 0.652***
(0.044) (0.044)
LOC Dummyt -0.124*** -0.043*** -0.124*** -0.043***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
CGI(VW)t−1 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001)
Sizet -0.155*** -0.142*** -0.136*** -0.081*** -0.154*** -0.142*** -0.136*** -0.082***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Cash Flowt 0.801*** 0.765*** 0.288** 0.802*** 0.766*** 0.288**
(0.105) (0.104) (0.144) (0.105) (0.104) (0.144)
TOBIN’s Qt 0.028** 0.024* 0.033 0.028** 0.025* 0.033
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022)
Leveraget 0.013 0.026 0.231*** 0.018 0.030 0.232***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.076) (0.062) (0.062) (0.076)
NWCt -0.443*** -0.437*** -0.262*** -0.442*** -0.437*** -0.262***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049)
Capext -0.254** -0.321*** -0.649*** -0.252** -0.320*** -0.650***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.159) (0.116) (0.115) (0.159)
Acquisitiont 0.016 -0.018 -1.482*** 0.021 -0.013 -1.470***
(0.260) (0.256) (0.259) (0.260) (0.257) (0.259)
R&Dt 7.923*** 7.330*** 2.664 7.800*** 7.213*** 2.564
(1.729) (1.658) (1.884) (1.733) (1.661) (1.888)
Payout Ratiot 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.005 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.005
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
Foreign Revenuet -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024)
Constant 0.982*** 0.834*** 0.898*** 0.485*** 0.979*** 0.833*** 0.897*** 0.486***
(0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.080) (0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.081)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 4178 3881 3881 2096 4178 3881 3881 2096
Adjusted R2 0.207 0.330 0.344 0.626 0.208 0.330 0.345 0.626
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Table 5
Temasek’s cash holdings in relation to their Investment and payout decisions
This table examines Temasek’s decisions in relation to investments and payout decisions. For Investment decisions, the depen-
dent variables are Capital Expenditure (Capext) and Aquisitiont. For Payout decisions, the dependent variables are Payout
Ratio (Payout Ratiot) and Repurchases (Repurchasest). Columns 1-4 are regressions with Temasek dummy as an independent
variable, whereas columns 5-8 are regressions with Temasek Voting Rights (Temasek VR) as an independent variable. The
firm’s excess cash (E.Cash) is the saved residue from the regression in Table 4 column 1. The sample consist of 4195 firm-year
observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. Firm’s industry classification is based on Fama French 17 industry
classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors are clustered at industry level. Superscript ***,**,and
* denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(A)TEMASEK DUMMY (B)TEMASEK VR
Investment Decision Payout Policy Investment Decision Payout Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Capext Acquisitiont Payoutt Repurchaset Capext Acquisitiont Payoutt Repurchaset
TEMASEKt−1*E.Cash -0.024 0.016* -0.387*** 0.013 -0.000 0.000 -0.007*** 0.001
(0.015) (0.010) (0.100) (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
TEMASEKt−1 -0.000 0.000 0.155*** 0.022 -0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.036) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Capext−1 0.600*** 0.600***
(0.025) (0.025)
Acquisitiont−1 0.139*** 0.140***
(0.034) (0.035)
Payout Ratiot−1 0.215*** 0.217***
(0.028) (0.028)
Repurchaset−1 0.167*** 0.167***
(0.046) (0.046)
E.Casht−1 0.001 0.006** 0.136*** 0.013* 0.001 0.006** 0.131*** 0.013*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.044) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.044) (0.007)
∆E.Casht−1 0.010 -0.003 0.016 0.018** 0.010 -0.003 0.018 0.018**
(0.007) (0.003) (0.052) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.052) (0.008)
Sizet−1 -0.002** -0.001* 0.013* 0.003 -0.002** -0.001* 0.013* 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002)
NWCt -0.025*** -0.003** 0.119*** 0.001 -0.025*** -0.003** 0.117*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.024) (0.005)
leveraget 0.021* 0.010* -0.226*** -0.015 0.022** 0.010* -0.227*** -0.014
(0.011) (0.005) (0.066) (0.018) (0.011) (0.005) (0.066) (0.018)
Revenue Growtht 0.004* 0.006*** -0.100*** 0.002 0.004* 0.006*** -0.099*** 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.006)
Constant 0.034*** 0.013*** 0.130** -0.011 0.035*** 0.013*** 0.130** -0.010
(0.007) (0.004) (0.053) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.053) (0.012)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 2842 2852 2852 2850 2842 2852 2852 2850
Adjusted R2 0.499 0.050 0.086 0.042 0.499 0.050 0.085 0.042
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Table 6
Temasek’s cash holdings in relation to Profitability
This table examines Temasek’s firms profitabiltiy in relation to holding excess cash. The dependent variables are all different
profitability measures namely Tobin’s Q, Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Sales or profit margins (ROS) and Return
on Assets (ROA). Columns 1-4 are regressions with Temasek dummy as an independent variable, whereas columns 5-8 are
regressions with Temasek Voting Rights (Temasek VR) as an independent variable. The firm’s excess cash (E.Cash) is the
residue from the regression in Table 4. The sample consist of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from
Capital IQ. Firm’s industry classification is based on Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC
code. The standard errors are clustered at industry level. Superscript ***,**,and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(A)TEMASEK DUMMY (B)TEMASEK VR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TOBIN’s Qt ROEt ROSt ROAt TOBIN’s Qt ROEt ROSt ROAt
TEMASEKt−1*E.Cash -0.243 -0.174* -0.027 -0.054*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001***
(0.204) (0.089) (0.131) (0.016) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
TEMASEKt−1 0.253*** 0.090*** 0.010 0.025*** 0.003* 0.001*** 0.001* 0.000***
(0.068) (0.025) (0.033) (0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tobin’s Qt−1 0.670*** 0.674***
(0.041) (0.040)
ROEt−1 0.268*** 0.271***
(0.057) (0.057)
ROSt−1 0.430*** 0.429***
(0.077) (0.077)
ROAt−1 0.653*** 0.657***
(0.028) (0.028)
E.Casht−1 -0.012 -0.032 -0.039 -0.010* -0.019 -0.035* -0.037 -0.011*
(0.057) (0.021) (0.043) (0.006) (0.057) (0.021) (0.043) (0.006)
∆E.Casht−1 -0.048 0.058* 0.023 0.012 -0.045 0.058* 0.023 0.012*
(0.089) (0.030) (0.059) (0.007) (0.089) (0.030) (0.059) (0.007)
Sizet−1 -0.047*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.002* -0.045*** 0.004 0.038*** 0.003**
(0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001)
NWCt 0.265 0.259*** -0.193** -0.023* 0.276* 0.262*** -0.198** -0.023
(0.167) (0.079) (0.079) (0.014) (0.168) (0.080) (0.079) (0.014)
Leveraget -0.069** 0.085*** 0.195*** 0.040*** -0.069** 0.085*** 0.195*** 0.040***
(0.032) (0.019) (0.038) (0.005) (0.032) (0.019) (0.038) (0.005)
Revenue Growtht -0.580*** -0.024 0.188*** 0.035*** -0.580*** -0.026 0.188*** 0.034***
(0.107) (0.054) (0.053) (0.011) (0.107) (0.054) (0.053) (0.011)
Constant 0.757*** 0.007 -0.175*** 0.009 0.742*** 0.003 -0.173*** 0.008
(0.095) (0.054) (0.066) (0.010) (0.093) (0.054) (0.065) (0.010)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 2851 2850 2850 2851 2851 2850 2850 2851
Adjusted R2 0.582 0.111 0.221 0.524 0.581 0.109 0.221 0.523
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Appendix
Industry Classification
This table presents the distribution of Temasek firms and non-Temasek firms in each of the 17 industry. Firm’s industry
classification is based on Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code.
Non-Temasek TEMASEK
INDUSTRY Freq. Percent Cum. INDUSTRY Freq. Percent Cum.
1 Food 296 7.49 7.49 1 Food 17 6.94 6.94
2 Mines 84 2.13 9.62 3 Oil 29 11.84 18.78
3 Oil 171 4.33 13.95 5 Durables 3 1.22 20
4 Clothings 70 1.77 15.72 8 Construction 5 2.04 22.04
5 Durables 297 7.52 23.24 11 Machn 29 11.84 33.88
6 Chems 65 1.65 24.89 12 Automobile 2 0.82 34.69
7 Consumer 40 1.01 25.9 13 Transport 105 42.86 77.55
8 Construction 504 12.76 38.66 15 Retail 6 2.45 80
9 Steel 117 2.96 41.62 17 Other 49 20 100
10 FabPr 80 2.03 43.65
11 Machn 619 15.67 59.32
12 Automobile 52 1.32 60.63
13 Transport 242 6.13 66.76
15 Retail 213 5.39 72.15
17 Other 1,100 27.85 100
Total 3,950 100 Total 245 100
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